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BOOK REVIEWS
ON INIQUITY. By Pamela Hansford Johnson. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons. 1967. Pp. 142. $3-95What should be done about books and films that exploit sex and
violence? Pamela Hansford Johnson attended the Moors Murder
Trial, and it shocked her into asking this question. The crime was
brutal enough to shock most of those who heard of it; a ten-year old
girl was tortured, sexually abused, and murdered by a young man and
woman who recorded their crime with tape-recorder and camera. The
shock of the trial provoked the question because the defendants
owned a modest library of some fifty books that were devoted to
sadism, sexual perversions, torture, and nazism. There is some reason
to believe that they were influenced by these books.
In truth, Miss Johnson's theme is broader than I have stated; her
own words are:
I have tried to examine whether there are things which may
encourage us in wickedness, or else break down those proper
inihibitions which have hitherto kept the tendency to it under
restraint. (pp. 11-12.)
However, when Miss Johnson talks of the details of that which may
encourage wickedness, she talks directly to the problem of the portrayal of sexual perversions and cruel violence in mass circulation
paperbacks and the theatre. Of course, it was sensible of her to limit
most of her discussion to questions of books, the theatre, and the
mass media, for this is the area of her own professional competence.
The question-can what we read and see make us wicked-is certainly worth asking; and if you wish to read a challenge to our current standards of permissiveness, then this book would be a good first
choice. Does she go so far as to argue for strict censorship? No; it is
reasonably clear that she does not want to supress books, but rather
wants to avoid the mass circulation of certain books. Moreover, she
does not object to the mere portrayal of sex; she does object to the
portrayal of sex-without-feeling, of sex-plus-cruelty. One cannot state
precisely what it is that Miss Johnson advocates, since she does not
work out the consequences of all of her ideas. She has deliberately
chosen not to carry her questions to their ultimate consequences and
work out a specific program; she has taken the approach that she is
merely asking questions and not answering them.
Since Miss Johnson has limited herself to asking questions, it
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is appropriate to wonder whether she has asked the right question.
Note that the form of her question is: can books (or movies, or
theatre) cause us to be wicked. The question may not be appropriate;
by choosing to focus on books as a cause of wickedness, she may
have chosen to focus on something that is not a very significant cause
(even if we grant that it is a cause) of the wickedness that we think we
see around us.
Doubt as to the appropriateness of the question is intensified by
a consideration of the type of wickedness it is that Miss Johnson is
talking about. The wickedness that threatens us is the creation of
an "affectless society" (Miss Johnson's phrase). We are in danger of
regarding other people as objects that exist to be used, instead of as
humans who are like ourselves; the affectless society is a society that
has suffered from a loss of feeling of each of its members for the worth
and dignity of others. I agree with Miss Johnson that this danger is
a danger worthy of our gravest fears; I doubt that books (or even the
mass media) are a significant cause. What role have large cities and
large corporations played in making our society what it is? Miss Johnson's diagnosis of our society may be correct, but the evils that she
sees may have been caused by the urbanization and industrialization
that have been so marked in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.
The incessant warfare of this century has probably also played a part
in brutalizing our society.
So far, I have suggested that Miss Johnson has asked the wrong
question; I fear that even if the books that she abhors were prevented
from entering the mass market that we would still be in danger of
the affectless society. However, even if the question is the right question, there is reason to believe that it is in the wrong form. The
form of the question focuses (perhaps unintentionally) on the content
of the books; however, the context in which a book is presented is
probably more important than the content of the book. At this point,
it is relevant to point to our own American experience with obscenity
laws. I would like to suggest (without attempting to demonstrate) that
the scholarly and judicial dispute over the meaning of obscenity has
established that there can be no satisfactory definition of obscenity
so long as the inquiry is directed toward investigating what is printed
on the pages of a book. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the
United States has apparently come to the same conclusion, if the
pandering principle of the Ginzburg case is in fact the guidepost to
future decisions.
My fundamental objection to Miss'Johnson's question can perhaps
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be made clearer by the use of a metaphor drawn from the example of
medicine. We can see that the body politic has developed a disease
that threatens to become more and more serious-the disease is the
affectless society. We can also see that this disease is accompanied by
a repugnant and repulsive sort of literature that exploits scenes of
sex-plus-voilence and sex-without-feeling. Miss Johnson assumes that
it is a cause of the disease, that it is some sort of virus. I assume that
it is a symptom of the disease, that it is like a fever. Of course, it is
rational to treat symptoms; if one can reduce the level of a fever then
the body can respond more efficiently to the disease. However, one
cannot treat a fever by surgery or amputation; there is no reason to
believe that we can deal with the fever of a debased literature by
attempting to amputate it.
Regardless of what is the right question, Miss Johnson has done us
all a service by writing about the trial. If we keep the facts of the case
in mind, we cannot avoid facing up to the reality that there is a
problem. The defendants in the case rejected the values that are
necessary for the continued existence of our society. We need to ask
why this happened. It is at least tolerably clear that as of the present
we do not know why.
LEWIS H.

LARUE*

VIETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, An Analysis of the
Legality of the United States Military Involvement. By The Consultative Council of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy
Towards Vietnam. Flanders, N.J.: O'Hare Books. 1967. Pp. "Ii
and Appendices. $2.00.

This book relates back to a pioneering legal memorandum issued
by the Lawyers Committee in the fall of 1965.1 Apparently the first

substantial examination of the legality of full American combat
actions in Vietnam, 2 the memorandum has been followed by an
*Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
'American Policy Vis-A-Vis Vietnam, Memorandum of Law, reprinted at 112
CONG. REC. 2552 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
2It was preceded by a short State Department Memorandum, Legal Basis for

United States Actions Against North Viet-Nam (March 8, 1965), reprinted at STAFF
OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss., BACKGROUND INFORMIATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM 199 (Comm. Print 2d rev. ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND INFORMATION]. A much more comprehensive
legal analysis of earlier American actions, made approximately two and one-half
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extensive and still burgeoning debate. In March, 1966 the office of
the Legal Adviser to the State Department issued a memorandum3
seemingly in response to the Lawyers Committee's conclusions that
American actions were illegal. The Foreward to the present volume
states that after the Government's legal analysis had been released
the Committee asked a number of eminent authorities on international law and relations to act as a Consultative Council and to prepare
a detailed reply. Vietnam and International Law is the result. It
appears to have been read widely as a decisive answer to the Government's case.4
The book concludes that American military measures on behalf
of South Vietnam have violated international law on many counts.
One of the principal claims is that the United States has acted
contrary to the United Nations Charter because the circumstances do
not justify the use of force in collective self-defense under Article 51:
there has been no "armed attack" and South Vietnam is neither a
member of the United Nations nor even a state with a government
capable of making an independent request for such assistance. Instead,
the United States is seen as having intervened illegally in a civil war
in South Vietnam. Violations of the 1954 Geneva Accords are also
charged on the grounds that the United States wrongfully supported
South Vietnam in frustrating the elections for unification scheduled
in 1956, gave prohibited military assistance (first in equipment and
supplies, and later increasingly in personnel) prior to and of a more
years before the bombing of North Vietnam started in February 1965, appears in
Comment, The United States in Viet Nam: A Case Study in the Law of Intervention, 50 CAuF. L. REv. 515 (1962).
3Dep't State (Legal Adviser), The Legality of United States Participationin the
Defense of Viet-Nam (March 4, 1966), reprinted at 112 CONG. REC. 5274 (daily ed.
March io, 1966), and at 6o Amt. J. INT'L L. 565 (1966).
'Witness a letter to the Editor of The Times from Mr. Philip Noel-Baker,
Labor M.P., in which he says, speaking of a reported change in American opinion
on the Vietnam war:
Further evidence is furnished by the book Vietnam and International
Law, which was recently published, and to which Lord Chorley and others
drew attention in your columns the other day. The collective legal authority
of the i American co-authors is very high; their argument is unanswerable. They show, with the fullest detail, that United States Government
policy in Vietnam has set aside the obligations of the U.N. Charter, of the
Seato Pact, of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, and of general international
law.
They also destroy the legend that the war was caused by an "armed
attack" on the sovereign state of South Vietnam by its "foreign" neighbour,
North Vietnam.
The Times (London), August 24, 1967, at 7.
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serious nature than North Vietnam's activities in violation of the
Accords, and engaged in war actions even before the occurrence of
the claimed attack by North Vietnam.
Additional major breaches of international law are asserted. The
United States is said to have started the bombing of North Vietnam
in February, 1965 as an illegal reprisal and to be using some methods of
warfare which would be illegal even if this were a case of justifiable
collective self-defense. Rather than being committed to its present
course by the SEATO Treaty, the United States is said to have
violated that compact. Failure to meet the obligation in Article 33(1)
of the Charter to seek a peaceful settlement of disputes also is charged,
as well as disregarding in the context of Vietnam the example set in
Laos by the 1962 Geneva Accords.
These charges are formidable. Some of the questions and many
of the supporting details are not examined in the Government's
memorandum. The gravity of the issues underscores the necessity of
discussion. This the book compels, and it contributes strongly to
an awareness of legal restraints on makers of foreign policy. Whether
or not one agrees with the book's conclusions they must give one
pause.
For example, what of the United States' obligation to seek a
peaceful settlement of this dispute? It is clear that prior to the start
of bombing in 1965 the United States engaged in numerous diplomatic
consultations about problems in Southeast Asia 5 and took part in
the 1962 Accords relating to Laos. 6 Yet many official statements also
suggested a policy of military victory in Vietnam. 7 The possibilities
of introducing ground forces and using air power directly against
North Vietnam were raised at high levels in the Government at least
as early as General Taylor's report to President Kennedy made in
November, 1961.8 Nor was the dispute in fact submitted formally to
the Security Council until January, 1966,9 nearly a year after the
bombing started.
5See Secretary Rusk's summary of these efforts at 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5-9

(1965).
OThese accords are set out in BACKGROUND INFORMATION 99-107.
7See, e.g., BACKGROUND INFORMATION 110, 114-15; House Republican

Conference Comm. on Planning and Research. The United States and the War in
Vietnam, 112 CONG. REC. 22,383-84 (daily ed. Sept. 2o, 1966); Staff of Senate
Republican Policy Committee, The War in Vietnam, 113 CONG. REc. H 5 24 8
(daily ed. May 9, 1967).
8See the passage from his report quoted by General Taylor during his testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966. THE VIETNAM HEARINGS
171-72 (Vintage ed. 1966).
'The letter of transmittal is reprinted at BACKGROUND INFORMATION 271-73.
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On the issue of reprisals, this characterization of the initial
American air strikes on North Vietnam in February, i965 seems not
to add to the book's prior rejection of the claim of armed attack.10
Nevertheless an earlier American strike presents a different case. In
bombing torpedo boats and facilities in North Vietnam following
illegal attacks on American destroyers in August, 1964 in the Gulf
of Tonkin, the United States appears to have gone beyond the reasonable objective of protecting its ships and their free passage through
international waters."
As to methods of warfare, the book's figures (p. 6o) for the tonnage
of American bombs dropped in Vietnam raise questions under the
principle of proportionality. The test is one of reasonable necessity in
relation to the values attacked, rather than an arbitrary limit on the
2
personnel and weapons to be employed in defense.1 Yet it must
be asked whether all of the ordnance used meets the test, and what
the relation is (particularly as this is considered a limited war) between
resulting military effects and non-military damage or injuries.'2 Still
2OSouth Vietnam's military position at the time was extremely bad. REPORT
COMM. ON FOREIGN REiATIONS, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE VIErNAM
CoNincr: THE SUBSTANCE AND THE SHADOW I (Comm. Print Jan. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Mansfield Report]; Warner, Vietnam, The Reporter, March 25, 1965,
at 28. If this was the result of an armed attack by North Vietnam, greater defensive measures would be justifiable. Although the White House statement announcing the 'bombing spoke of retaliation, as the book points out (p. 54), the
fact that Ambassador Stevenson also reported these measures to the Security
Council as taken in collective self-defense, BACKGROUND INFORMAnON 157-59, is
not mentioned. The same is true of the claim of collective self-defense made in
the Government's 1965 legal memorandum. Note 2 supra.
=This air strike is condemned as a reprisal in Stone, InternationalLaw and
the Tonkin Bay Incidents, in RASKrN & FALL, TnE VIETNAM READER 307 (Vintage
ed. 1965). The United States has argued that the raid was justified because the
incidents were part of a larger pattern of illegal use of force by North Vietnam.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 131, 134, 158, 227.
2
' McDOUGAL & FELICANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 218, 241-44
(1961).
"See SCmHEsINGER, TE BITTER HErrAGE 46-49 (1967) for some asserted instances
of excessive destruction and the opinion that if the present United States policy
continues, "I'he effect will be to pulverise the political and institutional fabric
which alone can give a South Vietnamese state that hope of independent survival
which is our presumed war aim." Id. at 47-48. Some American tactics which would
seem to involve very substantial chances of civilian casualties are described in
HARvEy, AIR WAR-ViETNAI (Bantam 1967). See, for example: "recon by fire" and
"recon by smoke" in areas of suspected Vietcong activity, techniques in which the
presumption appears to be that any persons "flushed" are enemy, id. at 57, 59-6o;
but for discussion of possible mistakes see id. at 62-63; saturation raids by B-52
bombers on Vietcong sanctuaries which may "set fire to 50 square miles of jungle,"
id. at 1O6-O7, 126-27; and "counter terror" operations, id. at 48. It is also -the case,
of course, that Vietcong and perhaps North Vietnamese forces as well have injured
civilians both deliberately and through the indiscriminate use of various weapons.
TO SENATE
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another of the book's conclusions is that the United States was not
legally committed to its involvement by acts of prior Administrations
or by the SEATO Treaty (pp. 67-70, 84). With this finding there can
14
be no dispute.
In its total character, however, I believe Vietnam and International
Law is not as even-handed an assessment of the Government's arguments as the first chapter suggests. The book was conceived as an
answer to the State Department's brief, which favored the position of
the United States. In challenging that brief the book makes an adversary presentation of the opposing case.
At the outset, the statement of "basic facts" deserves examination.
It is said, for example, that "[a] separate state or nation of 'South
Vietnam' has never existed" (p. 21). Reference is also made to a 1946
convention signed by the French and Ho Chi Minh which recognized
the Vietnam Republic as a free state within the French Union. Yet
there is no mention of two treaties signed in June, 1954 by France
and the State of Vietnam which allegedly made the latter independent
of France. These treaties are part of some observers' argument that
South Vietnam's predecessor state was fully independent before the
execution of the Geneva Accords in July, 1954. Although this claim
is disputed 15 it would seem to merit mention. Moreover, the issue of
For example see the list of various asserted terrorist incidents during the period
196o-i966 reprinted in i 3 CONG. REC. Hi864 -67 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1967), and
reports of execution of prisoners including civilians, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1967, at 12,
and of an attack on a village in which many civilians were killed, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 7, 1967, at 1, 14.
1
'The Treaty is set out at BACKGROUND INFORMATION 70-74. I disagree, however,
with the further conclusions in the book that unanimous consent is required under
SEATO for military measures and that even had such consent been given United
States actions would be illegal absent prior authorization from the Security Council.
The first argument is merely a variation on the book's conclusion that there was
no armed attack on South Vietnam. Unanimous consent is needed under Article
IV(2) of the Treaty in cases not involving such an attack, but if one has occurred
then Article IV(i) obliges each party to act (although not necessarily to use
force.) The second argument suggests that any military measures taken by the
SEATO parties would necessarily constitute regional enforcement action subject
to Council control under the Charter. But self-defense is not enforcement action,
as the State Department's brief correctly argues, 6o AM. J. INT'L L. 570-71. States
may act together in collective self-defense (before the Council takes action) even
though they belong to a regional arrangement. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIoNs
395-96 (6th ed. Waldock 1963); Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to
the Republic of Viet-Nam, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 16-17, and 17 nn.37 & 39 (1967).
"sFor the view that these treaties granted independence to the State of Vietnam
see Moore & Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic
of Viet Nam lo (May 1966), reprinted in 112 CONG. REc. 14,943 (daily ed. July 14,
1966), and in 5 DUqUESNE L. REV. 235 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Moore & Under-
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the South's historical "separateness" appears to be more complex than
the book indicates.16 In addition, the book's view of the Viet Minh's
asserted popularity derived from resistance to the Japanese during,
and particularly at the end of, World War II differs from other
accounts which emphasize the Viet Minh leaders' careful planning
and concentration on seizing power at the expense of other nationalist
7
groups.'
Secondly, important legal and factual issues are discussed in an
adversary manner. On the general scope of collective self-defense and
in its rejection of the claim of armed attack, the book's analysis does
not deal with certain contrary legal conclusions asserted by a number
of authorities. Nor does it examine some of the conflicting evidence
on the role of North Vietnam which has been developed in the general debate over American actions. Thus, collective self-defense is
termed justifiable only under the Charter's "very narrow exception"
(p. 26) to the general ban in Article 2(4) on the use of force by member
states individually. This exception is also said to be available only
if a member has been attacked (pp. 36-37, 39-41). Yet the restrictive
characterization in the former statement is disputed, and the latter
view, I believe, is incorrect.
Whether, even absent Article 51, defensive measures could conwood]; Young, The Southeast Asia Crisis, 1965 HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM 118; CROZIER,
SouTH-EAsT ASIA IN TURMOIL 93 (Penguin Books 1965). The treaties are said not to
have 'become effective, however. Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, 46
B.U.L. REV. 289 (1966), citing I WHrrEMAN, DscEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (Dep't
State Pub. 7403 (1963)).
'1See the comments on historians' findings of cultural and political differences
between North and South Vietnam in Rovere, Reflections: Half Out of Our Tree,
New Yorker, October 28, 1967, reprinted at 113 CONG REC. S1 5 ,7 19 (daily ed. Nov.
2, 1967). Substantial numbers of Vietnamese seem to have drawn political or religious distinctions between the two post-Geneva regimes in 1954 and thereafter.
It has been said that 86o,ooo refugees, including more than 5ooooo Catholics,
moved to the South after the Accords were executed, and that perhaps 8o,ooo Vietnamese moved to the North. Fall, How the French Got Out of Viet-Nam, in RASKIN
& FALL, supra note ii, at 88. According to a former member of the Canadian delegation to the International Control Commission, many North Vietnamese sought
exit visas through the delegation during 1956 and 1957 but were unsuccessful.
Blockley, The Origins of Crisis: Hanoi, 1957, 113 CONG. R .A8 9 2, A89 5 (daily ed.
Feb. 27, 1967).

"'See, e.g., a report made on June lo, 1965 to a parliamentary committee by the
Canadian Foreign Minister, who stated that in 1945 "refraining from any attacks
on the Japanese, the Communist-led movement concentrated on driving other
nationalist movements from the streets of [Hanoi]." 113 CONG. REa S14,4o9 (daily
ed. Oct. 9, 1967). See also FALL, THE Two Virr-NAlTs 6o-66 (rev. ed. 1964); LACOUTURE, VIErNAN BETWEEN Two TRUCES 7 (1966).
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stitute an act prohibited under Article 2(4)18 has been questioned. 19
Article 51 by its terms does not grant rights. Rather it recognizes,
pending action by the Security Council, what would seem necessarily

to be regarded as an established principle permitting the use of
force in defense. The claim that the Article is restrictive in nature

is certainly questionable. For example, the language "if an armed
attack occurs" is considered by many authorities not to bar military

responses (under the pre-Charter right of preventive self-defense) to
20

threats of attack.
Moreover, there seems to be less question about the correctness
of interpreting non-restrictively the reference in Article 51 to attacks
on member states. There is no suggestion in the Article that members
may call only on other members for military assistance. A non-

member's right of individual self-defense could well have no practical
value if it could not ask the far more numerous member states for help.
In neither their practice nor their expectations do states appear to
distinguish between members and nonmembers regarding rights of
"These provisions of the Charter are as follows:
Article 2
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
r

Article 5
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
59 Stat. 1037, 1044-45 (1945).
19
BEiRLY, supra note 14, at 420.
2Quotations from writings both for and against this broad interpretation
are collected in 5 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 981-91 (Dep't State Pub.
7873 (1965)). See also in support of a possible broad interpretation BRiERLV, supra
note 14, at 419-20. Indeed action to forestall an imminent attack in the form of aid
to Canadian rebels was taken against an American ship in The Caroline, 2 MooRE's
DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1906); 7 MooRE'S 'DIGEFsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
919 (go6),
a case cited in the book (p. 27) for a very restrictive view of the right
of self-defense. But see Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 1963 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 147, for the view that preventive action is no longer permitted.
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collective self-defense. 21 Many authorities also agree that under Article
22
51 members may lawfully join in the defense of nonmembers.
These subsidiary matters lead to the critical question whether
there was an armed attack on South Vietnam. Several related issues
are encompassed. These in turn raise disputed questions of fact and
law, some of which the book does not consider. In the first place, what
is the standard for an armed attack? The test given in the book, "if
military forces cross an international boundary in visible, massive
and sustained form" (p. 27), seems too narrow. It looks only to invasions in the traditional overt style. Yet any major use of force across a
border "against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state" (the prohibition in Article 2(4) of the Charter) should
justify defensive measures. Inciting and assisting armed revolutionaries
in another country has been considered an attack by some legal
authorities and has been condemned in at least two General Assembly resolutions as a threat to peace and to the values protected
in Article 2(4).23 This position also has been asserted by states in a
number of instances not mentioned in the book. 24 The authors contend that subversion and infiltration were well known before World
-"For example, both the United States and Russia, as parties to the NATO
and Warsaw Treaties, participate in mutual security arrangements calling for the
defense of states not members of the United Nations. It is suggested in Vietnam and
InternationalLaw (p. 40) that these pacts and the Korean Armistice Agreement deal
with zones of divided states and are therefore outside the Charter's purview. Yet if
the Charter does permit members to join only in the defense of other members, the
above interpretation seems no answer to Article io3 (providing that Charter obligations will prevail over members' other international obligations). Moreover, West
and East Germany and North and South Korea, having existed and acted as independent international actors for some time, should be considered states despite
absence of general recognition as such. BRIERLY, supra note 14, at 139. Again in the
Korean War both the United States, which took military action prior to the Security Council resolution calling for the use of force, and Britain, as stated by
Prime Minister Attlee, considered that participation in the collective defense of
South Korea, a nonmember, would have been legitimate had the Council failed
to act. SPANIER, THE TRUMAN-MAcARTHUR CONTROVERSY AND THE KOREAN WAR
35-38 (1959)2'Moore, supranote 14, at 13-x6; Wright, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation,
60 Am. J. INT'L L. 751 (1966); Moore & Underwood, supra note 15 , at 57-59; 5
WHrEMAN, supra note 2o, at io6o-8i; BmE.LY, supra note 14, at 394 n.i, 419.
2Moore, supra note 14, at 12 and the authorities there cited; Partan, supra note
15, at 35. 'Portions of General Assembly Resolutions 193 (1948) and 38o (195o) are
quoted in Moore & Underwood, supra note 15, at 43-44-"See Thomas & Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965-Legal Aspects,
1966 HA mARSKJOLD FoRUMT 27-28. During the recent fighting in Yemen the U.A.R.
commander was reported to have justified the bombing of towns in Saudi Arabia
on the ground that they were "bases of aggression" against the Republic of Yemen.
N.Y. Times, May 17, 1967, at 9.
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War II and were meant to be excluded from the category of armed
attack under the Charter (pp. 28-29), but it seems impossible to conclude that such means can never be as effective as an overt attack.
Indeed current reports indicate that depending on whether their
own security is at stake, states consider externally directed guerrilla
25
activity to be a danger or a weapon of consequence.
The second problem concerns the evidence regarding North Vietnam's activities. As Vietnam and InternationalLaw shows (pp. 28, 51),
the State Department memorandum, in asserting that by 1965 at
least 40,000 guerrillas had been infiltrated by the North into the South,
refers only to the portions of the 1962 International Control Commission report which find that activities of this sort occurred. The
memorandum may be assumed to rest also on the more detailed
factual presentation in the Department's report issued in February,
1965 and entitled Aggression from the North.26 In any event it
seems clear, as the book acknowledges (pp. 28, 30-31, 51, 57),27 that
the fact of infiltration has been established. There remains great dispute, however, over its amount and over the proper characterization
of North Vietnam's part in the conflict. Some observers have found
significant North Vietnamese presence and control, and the Canadian
28
Government has charged the North with what amounts to an attack.
'See, e.g., Cuba's alleged insurrectionary aims toward several Latin American
countries, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1967, at 38; N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1967, at 13;Burma's
reported fear of Chinese aid to guerrillas. The Sunday Times (London), Nov. 9,
1967, at 6; reports and charges by Rhodesian officials that guerrillas from Zambia
operate in Rhodesia, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1967, at a; The Observer, Aug. 27, 1967,
at I; charges by Kenya against Somalia, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1967, at I; N.Y. Times,
May 2, 1967, at 15;and claims by the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization
that China is providing arms and training for guerrilla warfare against Israel,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1967, at 12.
2Reprinted in BACKGROUND INFORMATION 171. For the view that this in fact
shows relatively little Northern support for the guerrillas in the South see Stone,
A Reply to the White Paper, in VIETNAM., HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, AND OPINIONS ON
A MAJOR WORD. CRISIS 317 (M. Gettleman ed. 1965).
7I'he Commission's 1962 report is reprinted in full at 113 CONG. REC. S4o86
(daily ed. March 20, 1967). The majority found that "in specific instances ...
armed and unarmed personnel" and supplies had been sent to the South to carry
out "hostile activities, including armed attacks," and that the North's zone had
been used to incite and support activities aimed at overthrowing the administration in the South. Id. at S4 o8 7 . South Vietnam was also found to have violated the

1954 Accords, as is discussed below.
'As to numbers, the report that only 400 North Vietnamese soldiers went into
the South in 1964 (pp.31, 90-91) differs from the figures in the State Department's
1965 paper, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 173, 181-82, and may or may not be the correct breakdown of the Defense Department's claimed total of 12,4oo infiltrators in
1964, 113 CONG. REC. S266 5 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1967). For the reports of significant
North Vietnamese presence see CROZIER, supra note 15, at 134-135, 137-43 (citing at
137 an alleged statement of Ho Chi Minh in 1959 to the effect that the North had to
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Others deny that such control existed and find the conflict basically
29
a civil war between the Saigon Government and Southern rebels.
Yet despite the extent of this controversy, the book does not discuss
statements tending to show a substantial military role on the part
of North Vietnam. Thus, as to the evidence by itself the book's judgment denying the occurrence of an armed attack is certainly incomplete.
In support of this judgment the book also makes the separate argument that whatever North Vietnam did was done in response to prior
violations of the 1954 Accords (pp. 28, 30-31, 48-52, 9 5 -97 )P3 But once
direct the anti-imperialist revolution in the South), and see the x966 articles by
N. Sheehan & T. Oka cited in Moore, supra note 14, at 9-o n.22. In 1965 the
Canadian member of the I.C.C., dissenting from a report that -the bombing of
the North indicated a violation of the 1954 Accords, said that this had resulted
from the North's increased efforts directed at the overthrow of the Southern
regime. Moore & Underwood, supra note 15, at 35. The Canadian Foreign Minister
made similar statements in presenting a report to a parliamentary committee on
June io, 1965. 113 CONG. RE. S14, 408-11 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1967). In a statement
made on November 26, 1967 the Prime Minister of New Zealand said "many
hundreds of documents captured from the enemy have established conclusively
that North Vietnamese control over the National Liberation Front and the
Vietcong is direct and all pervasive." 113 CoNG. REC. A6o4 5 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1967).
29In addition to citations in the book (pp. 64-65, 9o , 1o4) see Wright, supra note
22, at 758, 762 n.32; KAHIN SL LEwis, THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM 99-126 (1967);
Devillers, The Struggle for Unification of Vietnam, in VIETNAM, supra note 26,
at 23o; Fall, Viet-Cong-The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam, in RASKIN & FALL, supra
note ii, at 252-61. The United States Government's total estimate of 4oooo for
infiltrators during 1959-1964 is also relatively small in comparison with its estimates of combined Vietcong and Northern forces at the end of each year from
1960-1964. The respective figures are 36,ooo, 63,ooo, 79,000, 92,ooo, and 126,ooo. 113
CONG. REG. S266 5 , (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1967). Yet comparative numbers would not
necessarily show the extent of military direction or assistance and would not answer
the question whether the guerrilla war began on orders from the North.
3OThe authors note (p. 94) the absence of any argument in the State Department
memorandum that the 1954 Accords do not bind the United States. And in the
book many actions are termed United States violations of the Accords. Yet the
American representative's statement at the session when the Final Declaration was
adopted is not discussed (it appears in an appendix), and since he expressly stated
"my Government is not prepared to join in [the] declaration by the Conference,"
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 69, it would seem clear that the United States is bound
only by its own "unilateral declaration." In it the United States declared that it
would "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb [the Accords], in
accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter," and that it would "view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the... agreements with grave concern and
as seriously threatening international peace and security." Id. Thus to violate this
undertaking American actions would have also to violate the Charter. Moore &
Underwood, supra note 15, at 72-73, 76-81. South Vietnam accepted the demarcation line and the restraints on hostilities but has otherwise protested the Accords.
Id. at 81-82. If the South is regarded as bound, however, American actions which
were legitimate under its declaration could have involved South Vietnam in
breaches of the Accords.
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again there is conflicting evidence, and the argument remains unproven. Quoting from several reports of the International Control
Commission during the period 1955 to 1957, Vietnam and Interna-

tional Law shows that American war materials were frequently sent
to South Vietnam in ways that avoided the inspection provided in
the Accords. The book thus contradicts the assertion in the State
Department memorandum that the "considerable military equipment
and supplies" received by Saigon prior to late 1961 "were reported
to the ICC and were justified as replacements for equipment in VietNam in 1954."31 Moreover, the book quotes the findings in the Com-

mission's 1962 report-not mentioned in the Government's memorandum-that South Vietnam had violated the Accords in receiving
"increased military aid from the United States" and in establishing a
"factual military alliance" with this country (p. 51).32 The authors
also contend that American personnel participated in direct war
actions long before February, 1965, when the United States formally
announced that it was joining in the active military defense of South
Vietnam (pp. 51-52).
What of North Vietnam's activities? It has been charged with
receiving by mid-19 5 6 substantial assistance in arms and personnel
from the People's Republic of China in order to enlarge its military
potential. 33 The Canadian Foreign Minister stated in 1965 that after
the prospect of reunification elections had passed North Vietnam
resumed hostilities, using personnel and arms left in the South during
the period of free exchange specified by the Accords. 34 Complaints
against attacks by regular North Vietnamese troops were made by
Saigon to the Commission at least as early as November, ig6o.35 And
in the matter of personnel, the United States' claim that its forces
"The earlier I.C.C. reports are quoted at pages 49-50. The State Deparment's
assertion appears at 60 Ams. J. INT'L L. 577.
'See also 113 CONG. Ri c. S4o87-88 (daily ed. March 2o, 1967).
"3Speech of June 1, 1956 by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, quoting a
British Note given to the U.S.S.R. in April, 1956 (which protested the increase of the
Viet Minh army to 2o divisions from 7 in July, 1954), in BACKGROUND INFORMATION
80; Young, supra note 15, at 107, 113-14; Fall supra note 16, at go.

"See the Foreign Minister's report, supra note 28, at S14 ,4 io. He mentions evidence dealt with by a committee of the I.C.C. and quotes a statement of the Vietnamese Workers Party in July, 1954 which he views as showing "that the Northern
regime intended to interfere in the South." Id. For similar conclusions as to resumption of hostilities by North Vietnam see HAMMER, VIETNAM-YE7TRDAY

AND

TODAY 168-69 (1966), and Blockley, supra note 16, at A8 9 3 . But in rebuttal see
SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 17-19, where it is said that most scholars disagree
with the above interpretation.
"'BACKGROUND INFORMATION 7.
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increased substantially only in late 1961 after there had been a marked
increase in infiltration is supported by the statistics and is also the
view of the British Government. 36 Yet the Mansfield Report, as is
noted in Vietnam and InternationalLaw (pp. 30-31),37 concludes that
before 1965 mainly political cadres and military leaders were infiltrated, and that the arrival of North Vietnamese regulars in significant
numbers was a "counter-response" to the introduction of American
combat forces. However, the start of this infiltration is put at the
end of 1964, prior to the arrival of these American forces.38
An important legal issue arises from the phase of the "armed
attack" controversy just considered, and it is surprising that this too
receives little consideration in the book. Substantial violations of the
1954 Accords have been charged to both regimes, but what kinds of
treaty breaches justify resort to force? The most serious charges against
South Vietnam are repudiation of the provisions for an election in
1956 and its military build-up with American aid. North Vietnam's
chief violation is said to be the use of substantial armed force across
the demarcation line. As a matter of law, can the former violations
justify the latter? Under any interpretation of the Charter and Article
51, and particularly the restrictive one urged in the book, the answer
would seem necessarily to be no. Failure to participate in elections
cannot be an armed attack. Nor would a mere increase in military
potential qualify. Insofar as the Charter is relevant, this rule would
apply whether or not a treaty breach were involved and despite any
31 For the United States position see 6o Amnt.J. INT'L L. 577. In April, 1965 the
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said in the House of Commons:
flit is important to notice that in 1959, when this pressure from the North
began, and even as late as 1961-nearly two years later-there were still only
700 members of the United States Armed Forces in South Viet-Nam....
The action from the North preceded the arrival of United States forces in
any considerable degree in the South."
Moore 8&Underwood, supra note 15, at 31. Bernard Fall has stated that "the Geneva
Agreement ... allowed the presence of over six hundred American advisers, the
number there at the time of the cease-fire." Fall, Our Options in Vietnam, The Reporter, March 12, 1964, at 21. According to official United States figures, military
personnel in South Vietnam increased from 327 to around 7oo or 8oo at the end
of 196o, to 3,ooo at the end of 1961, and to 11,ooo at the end of 1962. See BACKGROUND INFORMATION 6; 113 CONG. REc. S2665 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1967). But these
statistics presumably would not include any personnel operating covertly.
"It should be noted that a typographical error on page 3o makes one reference
to the Mansfield Report, supra note io, inaccurate. The book states that the Report "also notes that by 1962 'United States military.., forces in South Vietnam
totaled approximately io,ooo men'" (emphasis added). Actually the word by
should be in (Mansfield Report, supra at 2), with the result that the figure of
io,ooo would not give force levels at the end of 1961.
MMansfield Report, supra note io, at 3.
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contrary provision in a particular agreement. While neither Vietnam
is a member of the United Nations, each is said to have an application on file. 39 And the rule would appear to be the same without
40
consideration of the Charter.
It is argued without elaboration in Vietnam and International

Law that the principle of material breach of a treaty (by the South)
justifies such resort to force as may be chargeable to North Vietnam.
The same contention is made in the State Department memorandum
to justify South Vietnam's disregarding the military restrictions of
41
the Accords in view of the alleged infiltration from the North. Yet
these two contentions differ significantly. The North is said to have
used force across the demarcation line despite the ban on hostilities,
whereas the South's military measures were defensive and were taken
(before the bombing started in 1965) on its own territory.
Initially the book's contention (p. 48) seems to be that Saigon's
breach of the election provision, 42 without more, entitled the North
to use force. This conflicts directly, however, with the general rule
that "the breach of a treaty is not in itself an 'armed attack' within
the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter." 43 Apart from the Korean
War, this rule seems to have been followed in the divided entities of
Germany and Korea after the breakdown of post-World War II
arrangements for elections and unification. And a different course
could well have been catastrophic. The book cites only the State
Department's memorandum as legal support for the claim that a
political grievance can permit military action otherwise prohibited
by a treaty. Perhaps the prospects of settling a war such as the one
ended in 1954 could be said to be improved if the sanction for a
violation of the settlement were the resumption of fighting. On the
other hand, this could increase the chances of political changes being
made by violent means. Any such asserted policy consideration would
'Moore & Underwood, supra note 15, at 27, 169 n.io4.

'0 BRIERLY, supra note 14, at 410-11.
416o Am J. INT'L LAW 577.
42

T'he book states (p-46 and n.64) that the I.C.C., and Britain and the Soviet
Union as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, insisted on the elections being
held. This is only partially correct in the case of the British Government, which
stated in a Note to the Soviet Union in April, 1956 that it had always considered
the elections advisable and had advised the South Vietnamese Government to
enter into consultations but that "Her Majesty's Government do not agree that
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam were legally obliged to follow
this course...." Moore & Underwood, supra note 15, at 218 n.278.
' 3 McNAIR, LAw OF TREAII.s 577 n.a (1961), quoted in Moore, supra note 14,
at 5,and in Moore & Underwood, supra note 15, at 88-89, 219 n.281.
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require careful examination, whereas the book makes its argument
without discussion of these factors (pp. 48-52).44
Perhaps this argument should be considered differently. The claim
may be that in its military build-up, together with the alleged American war actions prior to 1965, the Saigon regime violated the Accords
with what amounted to force.45 The means of doing so would have
been supplied by the United States. But if the North's military action
within South Vietnam prior to 1965 is to be justified under the Accords,
it must be on the theory that the North acted in collective self-defense
"The same question of the proper limits of the material breach rationale
,
arises in connection with the book's argument (pp. 36-37, 40-41 73-74) that as a
mere zone South Vietnam has no right to ask for aid in collective self-defense
(although apparently some such zones can be included in defense treaties the other
parties to which are clearly states) (p. 4o), see also note 21 supra. Of course if
South Vietnam were a state its right to make such a request would be established,
but the book does not consider in any detail the possibility that whatever their prior
status North and South Vietnam may have 'become de facto states since 1956. On
this point it is contended (pp. 37-39) that membership in United Nations agencies
and recognition by other countries have not conferred statehood on South Vietnam.
The latter assertion appears questionable in that states establishing relations with
either regime after 1956 would seem to recognize that entity as a member of the international community. See Letter from Professors Bishop, Baxter, McDougal, Sohn
& Alford to President Johnson, Feb. 14, 1966, in 112 CONG. REG. 3694 (daily ed.
Feb. 23, 1966). And India and Laos, at least, appear to have relations with both
regimes. Moore &: Underwood, supra note 15, at 29, 172 n.l16. There is other evidence as well, including carrying on diplomatic relations generally, acknowledgements of separate statehood during United Nations debates in 1957 and 1958 (over a
resolution for the admission of "Vietnam" and a counterproposal for the admission
of both Vietnams and both Koreas) and participation by both Vietnams as
parties in the 1962 Geneva Conference and Accords. Id. at 24-27; BACKGROUND INFORATION 99, 1O.
Several authorities have concluded that they are separate
states. Moore, supra note 14, at 4 and n.8; Moore & 'Underwood, supra at 29, 172
n. 119; Letter from Profs. Bishop, et al., supra; CROZIER, supra note 15, at 134-35.
See also BRIERLY, supra note 14, at 155. Contra, Partan, supra note 15, at 298;
Wright, supra note 22, at 757-59, 757-58 n.9, 759 n.21.

As to whether a zone may request aid in collective self-defense, a number
of authorities agree with the State Department's contention, 6o Am. J. INT'L L.
569-70, that even as a zone South Vietnam may properly consider the prior use
of force crossing the demarcation line as an attack under international law.
justification is found in 'the basic purposes of the Charter and of the 1954 Accords
to prevent such hostilities, and in the community's experience with continuing demarcation lines. Moore & Underwood, supra note 15, at 5, 253 n-53, 325-26 n.249.
Moore, supra note 14, at 1-2, 4-6; Partan, supra note 15, at 3o6 and n.81. This
contention is opposed as well. Vietnam is said to be a different case from other
divided countries, there having been a "colonial" civil war followed in 1954 by a
settlement looking toward unification. In these circumstances the material breach
principle is said to permit disregard of the cease-fire line after a major violation
of the settlement. Wright, supra note 22, at 756-6o; Falk, International Law and
the fUnited States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1125, 1129, 1137, 1153-54

(1966).
,'See Partan, supra note 15, at 3o4, 3o6-o8.
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with the National Liberation Front as the legitimate government of
46
the South (which is Hanoi's claim). If the Front is not such a government but is considered an indigenous rebel group fighting a civil
war in South Vietnam, Hanoi's assistance would be as much a violation of the 1954 Accords as Saigon's receipt of aid from the United
States, 47 assuming that the Accords bind the South. Nevertheless, in
these circumstances, the conduct of the state committing the prior
unlawful intervention could be regarded as an attack on the aggrieved
side in the civil war. That side could then request assistance from
another state.48 Thus the discussion in Vietnam and International
Law (pp. 65-66) regarding the alleged civil war in South Vietnam
and the duty of an outsider not to intervene in a civil war must be
read as contending either that no intervention is justifiable even
though another state has intervened illegally, or that only one of North
Vietnam and the United States is entitled to respond to the other's
intervention. 49 Which one is so entitled depends on the conflicting
evidence already reviewed.
On another important point the presentation in Vietnam and
InternationalLaw is quite one-sided. The Accords executed at Geneva
in 1962, which sought to end foreign interference in Laos, are held
out as "an Example of Peaceful Solution which Could be Followed
for Vietnam" (p. 76). But this suggestion is made without examining
the current status of the 1962 settlement. Both Vietnams and the
United States were among the parties, each of whom agreed not to
use Laotian territory to interfere in other countries' affairs and not to
bring foreign troops into Laos or to "facilitate or connive at" such
conduct. 50 Yet, in the United States' view it has complied substantially with these Accords whereas North Vietnam has not.51 Operations
of North Vietnamese forces are said to be documented in a report of
"lid. at 304. If this is the claim advanced in the book, questions of the Front's
origin and relation to North Vietnam, the extent of its control, and its international
standing should be examined.
7

4 d. at 299, 3o,

307.

"Id. at 307-08.
"It seems difficult to argue that the North may disregard the Accords entirely

and consider the United States the only intervener. North Vietnam has not acknowledged that its troops are present in the South and has maintained consistently that
the Accords (as interpreted by it) remain in force and indeed are the reason why
United Nations participation in the dispute would be inappropriate. See Moore &
Underwood, supra note 15, at 259 n.72, 257 n.70, 314-2o n.233; Partan, supra note
15, at 302, 314 and n.s18. But see Wright, supra note 22, at 756-6o.
W0BACKGROUND

INFORMATION

101.

"See, e.g., statements by Secretary Rusk in 1966 in Tim VIETNAM HEARINcs,
.Supra note 8, at 51-52, 278-8o.
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the Laotian International Control Commission published in 1966,52
and the Laotian Premier has reportedly estimated the numbers of
such troops at 4o,ooo.3 Alleged infiltration from North Vietnam via
Laos has been a major complaint of South Vietnam and the United
States since at least 196o and was an issue at the Geneva Conference
in 1962.54 None of these charges or reports is mentioned in the book.
There are conflicting reports too on the presence or absence of
American soldiers in Laos. In addition, United States planes are said
to have bombed infiltration routes since December, 1964.55 Thus
both sides seem to be violating the 1962 Accords at present, 56 but
questions of purpose and of responsibility for prior violations 57 bear
significantly on the war in Vietnam. The international obligations
assumed in 1962 by North and South Vietnam and the United States,
among others, would (if honored) seal Laos from the Vietnamese war.
That this has not occurred could be said to be a factor expanding
the latter struggle because it would be much easier to defend against
infiltration without striking directly at North Vietnam if the Laotian
border. were closed.5s Nor would the activity of either adversary in
aiding local factions in Laos appear to justify the other side's using
Laotian territory in connection with operations in Vietnam.
In summary, Vietnam and International Law is provocative but
rN.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1966, at 9;N.Y. Times, July 25, 1966, at 2. The Polish
member abstained.
0N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1967, at 4.
rASee BACKGROUND INFORMATION 7 (1960 complaint by South Vietnam), 88
(statement by Secretary Rusk in November, 1961).
t5As to the presence of soldiers compare N.Y. Times, June 17, 1966, at 4, with
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1967, at 6. The bombing is reported in Legislative Reference
Service, U.S. Policy Toward the Far East: Chronology of Significant Events 1844July 3o, 1966, 112 CONG. REC. 26,758 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1966).
rOFor a short summary of current interference by North Vietnam and the
United States in Laos see study prepared for S&NATE COaMIa. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
89Ti

CONG., 2D SESs., INEUTRALZATION IN SouTEAsr AsIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECrs 29

(Comm. Print. Oct. "1966). It would seem that 'whatever effect the settlement has
today.derivs less from the parties' feelings of obligation than from calculations
of national iiferest. See id.at 9, 29-30.
5 It has beefi argued that regarding the 1962 Accords "the Communist states
were pleased to achieve their objective- of 'the withdrawal of American military
power from Laos without accepting international control of -a kind which -might
obstruct seizure of power."' SENATE COaIM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56,
at 29, -quoting MODELSKI, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SETrTLEMENT OF THE
LAOTIAN QuESTION, 1961-62, at 33 (Canberra: The Australian National University
1962).

r'See articles discussing a barrier for the demilitarized zone, 113 CONG. REC.
A 3 5 76, A823 (daily ed. July 17, and Feb. 22, 1967) and naval patrolling of the
coast, Newsweek, July 31, 1967, at 26.
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adversary. That its questions should be asked cannot be challenged;
that in connection with many of them additional evidence and issues
should be considered seems apparent. The need for debate, including
examination of the future effect of American actions in other situations if they are considered as precedents rather than violations of
international law, remains compelling. In issue are not only the
conduct of and possible solutions for the war in Vietnam, but also
the rules for and the shape of American involvement elsewhere in
Southeast Asia. For example, to what should the United States look
ahead in Thailand?5 9 If the struggle in Vietnam came about through
"the politics of inadvertence... [and] a series of small decisions," 60
the importance of constructing a reasoned and legitimate policy for
other problems is self-evident.
ELIOT D.

HAWKINS*

THE LAWYERS. By Martin Mayer. New York: Harper &cRow. 1967.
Pp. xvii, 586. $8.95.
"Oh wad some power the giftie gie us
to see oursels as others see us!"
On beginning Martin Mayer's self-acclaimed "wide-ranging, often
anecdotal report on the law and its practitioners in the United States,"
I hoped that the author might vouchsafe us the "giftie" of which
Robert Burns sang. To say that this versatile journalist has disappointed us in this hope is to say more about the ambition of the
hope than the talent of the author or the quality of the book.
For Mayer has indeed attempted what his publisher has claimed
for him-a compendious survey not only of American lawyers in all
their shapes and forms, but of the law itself, its practice and customs,
the courts, agencies and miscellaneous bodies which apply it at the
urgings of lawyers, the tools, methods, and instincts which the bar
brings to bear, and indeed, the larger social questions upon which
all of these try to operate. That so huge an effort fails is not surprising; that it fails so well, is.
"'See the disturbing report and analysis in LOMAX, THAILAND: THE WAR THAT
Is, THE WAR THAT WILL BE (Vintage ed. 1967).
6°SCHLESINGER, Supra note 13, at 31.

*Attorney in practice in New York City; Member, New York State Bar Association Committee on International Law
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Mayer's first explorations take him to a sometimes anecdotal,
sometimes sociological description of the American Bar. In these
passages he describes who the American lawyers are without any
pretensions to examining why they are who they are. He brings to
this effort both the journalist's gift for particularization and epitome
and the characteristic fault of easy generalization and simplification.
Nevertheless, there emerges from Mayer's opening treatment of
the bar an inkling that he regards the subjects of his book with something approaching affection. To the lawyer-reader this, of course, is
gratifying and furnishes such a reader with a warm feeling as he
addresses the rest of the book.
The glow is only slightly dissipated as one advances to a discussion of the law schools. Here Mayer's thesis is that the intellectual
education of the American lawyer reflects the highest standards of
educational excellence, but may, nonetheless, fail to prepare its pupils
adequately for the practice of law in the real world. He finds that
it may well be desirable to expose candidates for a law degree to
the disappointment and disillusion, the conflicts and frustrations of
the society in which they must operate, before rather than after they
graduate.
The point is not a new one; the gap between a law graduate and
a lawyer-between a student and a practitioner and between a novice
and a professional-has been a matter of concern both to the law
schools and to the bar since the law schools first became a significant
force in the education of lawyers. The fact that the observation is not
novel does not detract, however, from the value of having it repeated.
Once again Mayer's eye for incident helps him dramatize this gap
and to remind us of the fact that the law and lawyers are supposed
to serve real social needs, not merely conform to high intellectual
standards. On the whole, however, Mayer's treatment of the function
and performance of the law school is both complimentary and optimistic. The lawyer-reader may think himself safe to proceed with
his self-esteem intact.
But not for long. Any treatment of American lawyers must confront the problems posed by the criminal law; it is too easy a mark
to expect that it would escape the attention of the author. The chapters on the criminal practice and law begin with a description of the
criminal law "the way it is now" and in these passages Mayer succeeds in conveying a sense of the human helplessness, institutional
irrelevancy, and pervasive dinginess which plagues what we pretentiously call the "administration of justice." There is almost a
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Dickensian ring to his indictment of the courtroom procedures. Read,
for example, a portion of his description of Felony Part in New York
County:
judge Simon Silver, looking quite small, as judges always
do in black robes, sits on a raised chair behind a very long
desk on a platform raised perhaps eighteen inches off the courtroom floor. Behind him are flags and (pace the atheist set) a
raised gilt motto: "N GOD WE TRUST." (The "I" has fallen
off.) Below him at a long table sit assorted clerks and probation officers. Over by the lawyers' door is a small desk and some
chairs for the young Legal Aid lawyers, three or four of them,
who will represent about three-fifths of the defendants. Backed
against the wooden barrier is a sometimes empty, sometimes
crowded row of wooden armchairs, for paid lawyers. People
are forever walking back and forth. On the wall at stage left,
where the jury box would be, there are more chairs for
policemen, chatting, lounging, waiting to lead their catch to the
bar. Besides the clerk's table stands a small raised platform
with a small table and wooden armchair, for witnesses. The
Assistant District Attorney, a very young lawyer with protruding eyes and a glum expression, stands at a lectern before this
platform, slightly stage left. In dead center, facing into the
public area, a uniformed policeman, known in the lingo of
the court as "the bridgeman," pulls folders from the clerk's
table .... (p. 151.)
Mayer is not content to chastize the criminal side of the law for
its imperfect furniture; he rebels against its apparent irrelevancy and
the indignity it imposes on its clientele. Not unnaturally, he looks
for "something better." Here he finds some glimmers of hope which
he displays just long enough to tantalize the reader into the tentative
belief that there may in fact be "something better" which is obtainable. He reviews the efforts of the Vera Foundation with respect
to bail, the hesitant gropings of our jurisprudence towards an
understanding of "insanity," the effort of the courts to afford some
measure of relief to juveniles charged with offenses, and the embryonic
efforts in the direction of correcting the appalling disparities in
sentencing procedures. The lawyer-reader almost lapses back into
the euphoria of the earlier chapters. But Mayer will not let us alone.
He concludes his "search for something better" with what must
surely be one of the most corrosive attacks on the criminal law ever
set down in a book of general readership: the obscene, vulgar tortured
ode of a Negro prisoner in a Mississippi jail.
Similar skepticism affects Mayer's treatment of the relationship
between the law and the poor. The target of his pessimism in this
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connection, however, is the utility of the judicial process as a means
for vindicating the rights of the poor. It is his thesis, essentially, that
the poor simply do not have adequate access to the judicial process
for the purpose of asserting their rights, and, moreover, when such
rights are asserted, the judicial process is too inflexible to appreciate
and establish those new groups of rights which most concern the
poor. Consequently, Mayer is forced to look to the legislatures as a
repository of relief for the poor and this, in turn, leads him to be
perhaps unduly harsh in his criticism of efforts, increasingly in evidence, to make the judicial process more understandable and accessible to the poor.
His review of the experience of legal aid and neighborhood
law offices, both public and private, gives him no encouragement
that they furnish the poor with any real prospect that their condition can be improved. "The battle to improve the condition of the
poor as a group (as distinguished from the fate of individual poor
people individually oppressed)," he says, "must be won in the legislature, not in the courts, and it is confusing and cruel to the poor
to pretend otherwise." (p. 302.)
Mayer's pessimism in this respect stems in part from his belief
that neighborhood law offices tend to be the purveyors of "a collection
of newly manufactured and unseaworthy rights." Yet he also spends
an entire earlier chapter in a somewhat turgid and imprecise canvass
of common law jurisprudence out of which there emerges reluctant
praise for the genius of a system that has historically manufactured
"rights" as societal pressures required them. One must wonder just
how "seaworthy" assumpsit or trespass were when first broached;
surely, as Mayer recites elsewhere at some length, the concept of
"fault" as the nexus of tort liability had a long gestation period and
painful birth. What Mayer may really be saying about the relevancy
of the judicial process to the condition of the poor is that in the
accelerating pace of modern social change the common law has
become obsolete, and no longer has the capability to make those
timely adjustments in the body of accepted legal doctrine that are
needed to make it an effective instrument of that change.
Shifting gears (as the author himself does with somewhat disturbing frequency throughout the book), some attention should be paid
to a phenomenon which most practicing lawyers reading this book
will regard as extraordinary. The book contains an entire chapter
on "Books, Binders and Bits." It is a zestful and imaginative description of the literature which practicing lawyers must use to ply
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their trade. What is remarkable about it is the color with which
the author invests so humdrum a corner of the profession; it is very
hard to make bibliography sing. This chapter illustrates the service
Mayer performs best for his professional reader: so much that is
familiar to the lawyer is new and fresh to the layman, with the
result that the former can enjoy new insights through the perceptions
of the latter.
If this book, then, explores jurisprudence and contingent fees, the
condition of the poor and the condition of the rich, the quantity and
quality of law and lawyers, the courts from Felony Part to Supreme
and does so usually with trenchant style, general sympathy, and
responsible criticism, why does it ultimately disappoint? For two
reasons, I suspect.
First, because the author has been ambivalent about his task and
ambiguous in his choice of audience, he has written a book that says
both too much and too little.
To lawyers, some things about which he writes are of value, some
of his insights are interesting, his compliments are pleasing, his
criticisms largely undisturbing, but in the end his treatment of serious
subjects will tend to be trivial to this readership and much of his
"anecdotal" treatment will be familiar enough to the experienced
lawyer to be trite. To the lay reader, I must imagine that the book
simply has too much to say about lawyers to command wide popularity. I simply cannot bring myself to believe, much as I love the
profession, that there is a very large body of people outside it who
wish to sit in their living rooms at the end of a hard day and read
586 pages of detail about all its nooks and crannies, no matter how
well crafted those pages may be.
In the second place, one must confess, the book disappoints because of "oursels." No power can really give "the lawyers" a sense
of satisfying self revelation. We are too many and different, too good
and bad, too rich and poor to be vulnerable to successful literary
capture.
Perhaps the book should be addressed as an anthology, rather
than as the systematic "report" it claims to be. There is external as
well as internal evidence to support the suitability of such an approach.
Many of the chapters were pre-published in more digestable bites and
directed to more selective readerships in various popular magazines,
including Esquire, Harpers, The Saturday Evening Post, Redbook
and even (!) T.V. Guide.
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Having read some of those articles as they were printed and
having been impressed with them, I must conclude that the book
eventually disappoints because, when finally assembled, it too often
becomes either precious or pretentious. The whole of the book, in
short, is not as good as the sum of its parts.
Louis A. CRAco*
*Partner, Willkie Farr Gallagher Walton & FitzGibbon; 'New York, N.Y.

